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1 Introduction
Ascertaining whether local election results are driven by incumbents’ perfor-
mance while in oﬃce or mechanically reflect constituencies’ ideological aﬃliation
and macroeconomic conditions is crucial for evaluating the alleged accountability-
enhancing property of decentralization. In fact, the thaumaturgic virtues of the
widespread process of devolution of taxing and spending powers to governments
that are closer to the people rest on the fundamental assumption of elections
as a disciplining device - the so called responsibility hypothesis (Nannestad and
Paldam, 1994), - according to which voters reward (punish) incumbent govern-
ments for (not) tailoring service provision to local needs and acting in the public
interest.
The early economic tests of the responsibility hypothesis at the decentral-
ized level of government (state or municipal) mainly focused on - and typically
could not reject - the hypothesis of voters as “fiscal conservatives” disliking
public spending growth and debt accumulation (Peltzman, 1992). More recent
economic research challenged the fiscal conservative view and drew attention
to the vote-buying power of public expenditures. A number of aspects of pub-
lic spending policy have been considered in the literature, with more recent
investigations focusing on the electoral consequences of the mix and cycles of
various categories of decentralized expenditures (Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya,
2004; Veiga and Veiga, 2007; Sakurai and Menezes-Filho, 2008; Solé-Ollé and
Sorribas-Navarro, 2008; Cole et al., 2009; Jones et al., 2009; Litschig and Mor-
rison, 2010; Drazen and Eslava, 2010).
Strictly speaking, though, an ideal empirical test of the responsibility hy-
pothesis at the local level of government would require investigating whether
the actual performance of decentralized policy-makers - in terms, say, of the
quality and cost of the eﬀective public services delivered to the people - has an
impact on their chances of reelection. However, due to the fact that raw data on
a plethora of local governments’ budgetary items abound, while accurate pub-
lic service outcomes are rarely observable, only few recent contributions in this
area have been able to ascertain the impact of sensible measures of local gov-
ernment performance on election results. Brender (2003) uses widely observed
student performance scores as a measure of education quality, and studies their
impact on local contests in Israel. Revelli (2008) exploits the performance eval-
uation process of English local authorities that is conducted by an independent
commission (the Audit commission) and is openly spread by the major media,
and investigates the consequences of authorities’ performance ranking on their
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chances of reelection. Finally, Litschig and Morrison (2010) provide indirect ev-
idence that higher grants increase the re-election chances of local governments
in Brasil by inducing a larger provision of public goods.
In a similar vein, recent research points to the potentially crucial eﬀect of
information on the likelihood of voters “crossing party lines” and reinforcing
government responsibility (Casey, 2011): better information about candidates’
competence and honesty can strengthen the accountability nexus and play an
important role to avoid poor or distorted information political contests and low
accountability equilibria in which citizens cast their votes blindly along partisan
lines (Ferraz and Finan, 2008; Da Silveira and De Mello, 2011; Fergusson, 2011).
Among the many aspects of public policy that can signal the quality of gov-
ernment, some recent literature has focused on the potentially important role
of environmental protection policies implemented by decentralized governments
as an indicator of government motivation - oﬃce versus policy - and respon-
siveness (List and Sturm, 2006; Fredriksson et al., 2011). However, and mostly
due to lack of data, the key relationship between decentralized environmental
policy and the popularity of incumbent governments has not been explored yet.
This paper aims at shedding light on that issue by employing a unique and
highly visible index of environmental performance of the Italian major cities
and investigating its impact on the popularity of local governments. Given that
environmental protection is one of the main responsibilities of Italian munic-
ipalities, we can verify the degree of “environmental accountability” of local
policy-makers and test for the first time whether urban environmental quality
is a relevant issue in local elections.
The urban environmental quality index that we employ is built and released
for the 100 Italian chief towns of province by an independent environmental
organization (Legambiente) with the aim of raising local communities’ aware-
ness of environmental issues and pushing municipal authorities to adopting good
practices, following a sort of “name and shame” philosophy. The index has been
available on an yearly basis for over a decade, and ranks Italian cities according
to a large number of variables including green space, air quality in terms of pol-
lutant emissions and its consequences on human health, drinking water quality,
public transportation systems, energy consumption and waste recycling perfor-
mance. Importantly, the report receives considerable media attention, with the
main national and local newspapers and televisions openly commenting on the
environmental performance and ranking of cities. We can consequently expect
that the ample visibility of the city ranking generates awareness among citizens
about the quality of their urban environment and the ability of city governments
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to adequately preserve it. In fact, the Legambiente ranking implicitly consti-
tutes an assessment of the performance of local policy-makers in managing their
environmental tasks.
We estimate a vote equation on all municipal elections that were held in
the Italian chief towns of province between 1998 and 2007 in order to elicit
the determinants of local election results. The evidence expectedly points to
the important role of national politics and localities’ ideological attachment in
city election contests. Moreover, the results are compatible with the traditional
portrait of voters as “fiscal conservatives,” though the detrimental popularity
impact of local property tax rises seems likely to be attributable to a signal of
poor managerial competence. Finally, it turns out that a city’s environmental
score as reported by the media prior to the elections has a remarkable impact
on the fortunes of city governments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly illustrates
the institutional structure and electoral system of local government in Italy, dis-
cusses the role and accountability of city governments in environmental protec-
tion, and introduces the Legambiente environmental performance score. Section
3 builds the empirical model and highlights the key econometric issues in esti-
mating a local vote function and testing the responsibility hypothesis; section 4
presents the estimation results, and section 5 concludes.
2 Institutional framework: the role of local gov-
ernments in Italy
Italy has a three-tiered (regional, provincial and municipal) structure of gov-
ernment. The municipal tier is made of a varied and fragmented universe of
over 8,000 localities, about one-hundred of which are larger cities that also act
as chief towns of province and play a crucial role in the provision of a num-
ber of public services in urban areas, including: social care, local police, road
cleaning and maintenance, public transportation systems, water services, waste
management, and environmental protection.1 While municipal services used
to be traditionally funded by central government lump-sum grants, two radical
reforms implemented in the early 1990s strengthened the fiscal autonomy and
accountability of municipal governments by introducing a municipal property
tax and direct election of the mayor in a plurality vote system.
1 In what follows, we disregard the three chief towns of the autonomous provinces in the Alps
(Bolzano, Trento and Aosta) because of their peculiar geographical location and institutional
structure.
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First, a municipal tax on residential and business properties was introduced
for the first time in the Italian tax system in 1993. The tax base is uniformly
defined by the national government based on cadastral property values, and
municipalities set the property tax rate between 0.4 and 0.7 percentage points of
the assessed property value. The property tax is an important source of revenue
for the cities: it represents nearly 50% of total tax revenues of local governments,
and more than 25% of total local government spending. The property owner is
liable for the payment of the tax to the municipal government where the property
is located, irrespective of the owner’s residence. However, city governments
can set diﬀerent tax rates depending on the property destination and owner’s
residence: a (typically lower) residential tax rate is applied on resident household
owners, while a business tax rate is applied onto all other kinds of properties,
including commercial and industrial buildings and vacation homes.2 Since a
high proportion of the Italian population (around 34) is home-owner, the local
property tax has a great visibility and is generally perceived as a signal of the
cost of local public services. Moreover, every year property owners receive by
mail detailed information about the tax due and the terms of payment, making
the setting of the residential property tax rate the crucial fiscal choice that
mayors have to make (Bordignon et al., 2003; Padovano, 2008).
Second, direct election of the mayor in a dual ballot was introduced in the
local government electoral system in 1993 in order to guarantee strength and
stability to municipal legislatures, and to make them accountable to their elec-
torate. If no mayor candidate gets more than 50% of the votes at the first stage,
the two most voted candidates run again at the second ballot, with a major-
ity bonus being awarded to the coalition supporting the winning candidate.3
As shown in appendix A, the Italian political environment remains character-
ized by a multitude of political parties. However, the new electoral system had
the most visible eﬀect of leading to the formation of two main coalitions, i.e.,
center-left and center-right, that - thanks to the seat allocation system guaran-
teeing at least 60% of the council seats to the coalition supporting the mayor -
typically rule for the entire length of oﬃce (five years). Moreover, the law in-
troduced a two-term limit with the aim of reducing the incumbency advantage
and encouraging political competition for municipal oﬃce.
One of the main responsibilities of Italian city governments is to protect the
2 In 2008, the national government abolished the local property tax on the first home
dwellings. This change has no eﬀect on our analysis, since our dataset ends in 2007.
3Between the two rounds of voting, the parties supporting candidates who did not get to
the second round can make an explicit agreement with one of the two remaining candidates
and share the majority bonus in case the endorsed candidate is elected at the ballot.
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environment in urban areas and preserve the health of citizens. Urban environ-
mental quality involves a number of aspects of city life - including the quality of
air and drinking water and the availability of green areas and public transports
(Riseborough, 2000; Yuan, 1999) - and calls into question some crucial munici-
pal policies, such as traﬃc planning and limitations, cleaning and maintenance
of roads, waste water treatment, and waste management. The importance of
those responsibilities is reflected in the share of municipal current expenditure
for the environment that, for the major Italian cities, represents over 30% of
total municipal expenditure.
While urban environmental quality is clearly a hard to measure multidimen-
sional phenomenon, an independent environmental association (Legambiente)
publishes an yearly report - “Ecosistema Urbano” - where the chief towns of
province are evaluated and ranked based on their environmental performance.
Even if those one-hundred cities represent only one seventeenth of the Italian
territory, they actually face a core set of environmental problems such as poor
air quality, high level of traﬃc and congestion, noise, poor-quality built environ-
ment, derelict land, greenhouse gas emission, urban sprawl, and generation of
waste. The Legambiente report evaluates the quality and sustainability of the
urban environment in order to disseminate knowledge to citizens and policy-
makers on relevant environmental matters, to stimulate local governments to
implement appropriate strategies and to assess the eﬀectiveness of the imple-
mented environmental policies.
In particular, Legambiente ranks the cities on the basis of three wide cate-
gories of indicators that are selected according to the standards and objectives
of sustainability identified by the European Union (EEA, 2009) and the OECD
(2000). The first category of indicators refers to the quality of the physical envi-
ronment registered in the cities, such as air pollution, noise pollution, drinking
water quality and rate of mortality for breathing apparatus diseases. The sec-
ond category concerns the pressure exercised on the environment by human
activities, as, for example, consumption of fuel, electricity and water, waste
production and population density. Finally, the third category refers explic-
itly to the policies implemented by municipalities. This set of indicators (that
includes the share of separate waste collection, the intensity of use of public
transports, the urban green space available to citizens, and the municipal moni-
toring activity of harmful polluters) intends to be a proxy of the environmental
management ability and eﬀort demonstrated by local policy-makers. Appendix
B reports in detail the features of the Legambiente Index and the city ranking
criteria.
6
The Legambiente index has a number of attractive features. Firstly, multidi-
mensional environmental aspects are blended into a single score of environmental
quality that is easy to grasp and use for intercity comparisons. Secondly, the
environmental score has been available for well over a decade on an yearly ba-
sis for all the chief towns of province, and is comparable across years. Finally,
and more importantly, the report receives notable national and local media at-
tention. In fact, for some time after its oﬃcial publication and release, that
typically occurs around November or December, national and local newspapers,
televisions and blogs vivaciously discuss the environmental performance and
ranking of cities. The high visibility and widespread popularity of the Legambi-
ente ranking might in fact raise voters’ awareness of environmental issues and
stimulate their demand for adequate environmental protection policies on the
part of city governments. Moreover, the fact that the ranking implicitly consti-
tutes an assessment of the performance of city policy-makers in managing their
environmental tasks might have non-negligible electoral consequences.
In order to investigate the determinants of local election results, and in par-
ticular to test the fiscal and environmental accountability of city governments,
we have collected complete data on all elections that were held in the 100 chief
towns of province between 1994, right after the new electoral system started,
and 2007, the last year for which complete information on election results and
city characteristics and policies are available. The election results are based on
oﬃcial data of the Home Ministry of the Italian Government and are described
in more detail in appendix A. Using those election data, we focus on the impact
of environmental and fiscal performance on mayors’ popularity.
3 Empirical analysis: the local vote equation
Conventional empirical tests of the responsibility hypothesis at the local level
of government either rely on the share of the vote earned by the incumbent at
the elections held at the end of the term of oﬃce (Revelli, 2002; Bosch and
Solé-Ollé, 2007; Veiga and Veiga, 2007; Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro, 2008;
Cole et al., 2009; Drazen and Eslava, 2010), or employ a binary re-election -
success or failure - outcome (Besley and Case, 1995; Revelli, 2008; Sakurai and
Menezes-Filho, 2008; Jones et al., 2009; Litschig and Morrison, 2010). It seems
preferable here to follow the former approach and use a continuous vote share
variable so as to fully exploit the available vote information. In particular, we
measure the electoral result of the incumbent government (i.e., the government
that was voted into oﬃce in municipality m at the elections held at time t− l,
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with l being the length of the term of oﬃce) by the share of the vote it got at
the subsequent election held at time t. Given the dual-ballot electoral system,
we always use the share of the vote earned by the coalition supporting the
incumbent mayor in the first round of elections in order to have comparable
figures across elections.
We start by expressing the vote share of the incumbent at the elections held
at time t in municipality m by the following linear specification:
vpmt = ipm + cpt + µpmt (1)
where p is an index of the party (or coalition) aﬃliation of the incumbent
government (left-wing or right-wing). Equation (1) highlights the three funda-
mental components of the election outcomes. First, ipm is a sort of normal vote
share of party p in municipality m due to ideological attachment of the elec-
torate, and is taken to be time-invariant (Peltzman, 1990); any historic trend
in political party popularity is captured by time eﬀects and their interactions
with party indicators (see below). Second, cpt captures the common influence on
party p representatives in local contests from the nationwide popularity of party
p leaders, and might reflect the state of the economy (inflation, unemployment,
growth), as well as the relevance of foreign policy stances or national political
scandals. Finally, µpmt is the component of the vote share that is attributable
to the responsibility hypothesis, and depends on the policies enacted and the
performance attained by the city’s incumbent during its term of oﬃce. In par-
ticular, we hypothesize that µpmt is a linear combination of the fiscal (τ) and
environmental (e) performance of local governments during their term of oﬃce,
plus a random component (ε):
µpmt = βττmt + βeemt + εmt (2)
βτ = βe = 0 would imply that local elections are simply driven by the ide-
ological complexion of the jurisdiction (ipm), the popularity of national party
leaders (cpt) and random shocks (εmt), thereby dismissing the role of local gov-
ernment performance in driving local electoral results and raising doubts on the
public service eﬃciency-enhancing property of decentralization. In the empiri-
cal work, we test the responsibility hypothesis (2) by employing the residential
property tax rate set in the election year as an index of fiscal performance (τmt)
due to its high visibility and purposeful accountability-enhancing role.4 Second,
4Similar results are obtained when using the term of oﬃce average residential property tax
rate.
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we use the absolute Legambiente city score (alternatively, the city ranking) as
a measure of environmental performance (emt). In particular, for each election
we use the Legambiente score (ranking) that was released in the immediacy of
the election date. Given that local elections typically occur in spring and that
Legambiente discloses its assessment around November or December, the envi-
ronmental performance ranking released at time t− 1 (and based on data from
year t−2) is used in the elections occurred at time t. This amounts to assuming
that voters at time t use the latest release of the environmental ranking, and
disregard - or ignore - the state of the environment in their locality in the most
recent years. Consequently, in order to check whether current environmental
performance is taken instead into account by voters, we alternatively include in
(2) the environmental index that relies on the data collected in the election year
t (and label it emt) and is released only after the elections.
In order to control for the impact of national politics, cpt, equation (1)
includes year-party specific eﬀects by interacting year dummies with political
party (left versus right) dummies. As further controls, we include a dummy
variable capturing the incumbent advantage of a mayor running for re-election
(= 0 if the mayor steps down voluntarily or because of a binding term limit)
and a political aggregation dummy that is equal to 1 if the ratio of the number
of parties supporting the incumbent mayor over the total number of parties par-
ticipating at the election is larger than the same ratio in the previous election.5
An important issue when estimating vote equations on a time-series of cross-
sectional election outcomes consists in properly controlling for the time-invariant
partisanship of the electorate ipm. Correlation between unobserved time-invariant
ideological traits in a locality and the fiscal or environmental policies imple-
mented there would bias the estimates of the causal eﬀects of those policies
on the popularity of incumbents. In principle, the “fixed” municipality eﬀect
ipm in (1) could be swept away by diﬀerencing between consecutive elections:
vpmt − vpmt−l. However, diﬀerentiation would not eliminate the fixed party ef-
fect in those instances where party p was not in power in the previous term of
oﬃce (t−2l, t−l).6 Moreover, diﬀerentiation would imply renouncing altogether
5Unlike what happens in two-party systems, in a multi-party environment such as the Ital-
ian one, party coalitions might change between elections t− l and t, making the accountability
nexus a bit blurred and harder to verify. However, in most instances the bulk of the coalition
stays the same in subsequent elections, while the number of smaller parties supporting one of
the two coalitions (i.e., the center-left and the center-right) might change. Consequently, we
control for the overall number of parties supporting the incumbent mayor in distinct elections.
This is basically the same strategy followed in other empirical works applied to multi-party
contests (Vermeier and Heyndels, 2006; Bosch and Solé-Ollé, 2007).
6One possibility consists in building a “responsibility” indicator dt−l = 1 (or dt−l = −1)
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to the first wave of elections and would consequently lead to a considerable data
shrink. Therefore, for all municipal elections held between 1998 and 2007 we
proxy the normal, long-term ideological attachment to party p in city m (ipm)
by the average vote share earned by party p in each municipality in the elections
for regional government that were held nationwide in 1995, 2000 and 2005.
Finally, one might want to allow for dynamics in equation (1): a shock to
popularity at a given election might be persistent over time and influence the
share of the votes of the incumbent government in subsequent elections too. As
is customary in the literature, we also estimate a specification that includes the
predetermined share of the vote got by the incumbent in the previous election
(vpmt−l) along with the above described components ipm, cpt, and µpmt.
4 Results
The results of estimation of Eq. (1) with µpmt as defined in (2) are presented in
Table 1. In all estimations, the dependent variable is the share of the vote earned
at the first round of the elections held at time t by the coalition supporting the
incumbent mayor. Similar results - presented in Table 2 - are obtained when
using the log of the odds ratio, according to which the dependent variable is
expressed as the logarithm of the relative vote share of the incumbent party:
log(
vpmt
1−vpmt ).
7 We focus here on the estimation results of the linear specification
for the more intuitive and straightforward interpretation of the coeﬃcients.
In columns 1 to 3 of Table 1, three distinct measures of environmental quality
are used: column 1 uses the absolute environmental score released by Legam-
biente for each city just before the election date emt; column 2 uses the corre-
sponding rank position - 1st to 100th - of a city, labelled r(emt); column 3 uses
instead the environmental score based on the election year data and released
after the elections (emt): by doing so, we verify if the relevant environmental
impact on elections occurs through the media release of the performance score
(emt), or via direct experience of voters of government ability in environmen-
tal management (emt). Next, in columns 4 to 6 the local property tax rate is
included along with the above environmental performance indices.
if the incumbent at time t was the incumbent (or was the challenger) at the elections held at
time t− l (Hibbs, 1982): vpmt−l = ipm+ cpt−l+dt−lµpmt−l. However, this procedure is best
suited to strictly two-party systems.
7The logistic transformation ensures that the share is bounded between 0 and 100 percent-
age points, while linear predictions may give implausible results outside that range. However,
we have verified that the predictions of the linear models are included in the admissible range.
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Remarkably, environmental performance has a positive and significant eﬀect
on the popularity of the incumbent in all specifications that include the Legam-
biente index - either the score emt or the ranking r(emt) - that is released just
before the elections. In terms of magnitude, a one point improvement in the
score is expected to increase the incumbent’s share of the vote by 0.27 percent-
age points in column 1, and almost 0.3 percentage points in column 4 when also
the fiscal policy is included. Similarly, the rank position of a municipality turns
out to have a significant popularity impact. According to the estimation results
in column 2, the electoral cost for the incumbent’s coalition of a ten position
drop in the ranking is expected to be of about 0.6 percentage points. On the
other hand, columns 3 and 6 show that the environmental quality registered in
the year of election - and released through the Legambiente report well after
the elections - turns out not to have any significant eﬀect on the vote share,
reinforcing the hypothesis that the environmental accountability mechanism is
driven by the independent assessment of performance released and publicized
by the media right before the elections.
As for fiscal accountability, the estimation results suggest that the residential
property tax rate set in the election year has a significant and negative impact
on the incumbent’s share of the vote. This result emerges in all specifications
of Table 1 and Table 2, irrespective of which of the environmental measures are
included.8 An increase of 1 point in the local tax rate is estimated to negatively
aﬀect the share of the vote of the incumbent by about 2 percentage points.
As far as the other variables are concerned, the average vote earned by
the incumbent coalition in regional elections plays a large and significant role,
demonstrating the high partisanship of the electorate in Italian municipalities.
Furthermore, mayors that run again to get re-election have an incumbency ad-
vantage that is estimated to be about 4 percentage points. Finally, coalitions
that enlarge with respect to previous elections earn on average a 6 percentage
points larger share of votes.
Table 3 presents the estimation results when the lagged vote share is in-
cluded among the explanatory variables. As a benchmark, column 1 reports the
results when the average vote earned by the incumbent’s coalition in regional
8We also verified if the ideology of the incumbent’s coalition matters to voters. In the
literature (Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995), it has been hypothesized that voters could have dif-
ferent expectations on policy outcomes, depending on the government ideological complexion.
In particular, we tested if right-wing coalitions suﬀer more severe electoral consequences from
local property tax rate rises, and if the popularity of left-wing coalitions is more vulnerable to
poor environmental performance. However, we did not find any compelling evidence in that
regard.
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elections is not included. The share of the vote of the incumbent’s coalition in
the previous election has a significant positive impact, meaning, as expected,
that popularity is serially correlated. In fact, the average vote earned by the
incumbent’s coalition in regional elections remains significant too, but the esti-
mated coeﬃcient is lower with respect to the one estimated in the static model,
since now part of the partisanship is explained as persistency of shocks to pop-
ularity rather than as time invariant ideological traits. For what concerns the
other variables, the estimation results in the dynamic specification are similar
to the static ones. The two crucial policy outcomes - the local property tax
rate and the Legambiente score - always display a significant eﬀect, and the
coeﬃcient of the latter variable is slightly larger than before. An increase in the
Legambiente score by one percentage point is expected to increase the incum-
bent’s share of the vote by over 0.3 percentage points. Finally, it is interesting
to notice that the two local policies remain significant even after controlling for
partisan attachment, persistence of popularity, and national politics.
4.1 Policy Endogeneity
In principle, the policy variables included in the vote equation could be strate-
gically manoeuvred by incumbent governments with the aim of improving their
re-election chances. Consequently, they cannot be assumed strictly exogenous.
As far as the municipal tax policy is concerned, if an incumbent expects a nega-
tive (positive) shock to her re-election chances, she can strategically reduce (or
aﬀord to raise) the local property tax rate prior to the elections. This implies
that the observed tax rate would not be orthogonal to the idiosyncratic error
term. Moreover, omitted variables that are correlated with the property tax
rate - such as government ineﬃciency or waste - and have an eﬀect on govern-
ment popularity would bias the causal eﬀect of the property tax rate on election
results.
On the other hand, the features and timing of the construction process of
the urban environmental quality score virtually rule out any chance of short-
term strategic manoeuvring by opportunistic incumbents before the elections:
in addition to being the result of a multifaceted policy-making process that can
hardly have substantial eﬀects in the short run, the environmental score pub-
lished at the end of year t − 1 - and having an impact on the elections held
at time t - relies on municipal data from one or two years earlier. As a result,
incumbents have little chance of strategically manipulating their environmental
performance score when elections approach, and the performance score released
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before the elections is orthogonal by construction to unpredicted shocks occur-
ring in the later years of the term of oﬃce.
Therefore, we allow for endogeneity of the local property tax rate and em-
ploy the following set of instruments. First, the hypothesis of rational voting
and political market eﬃciency (Peltzman, 1990; 1992) dictates that all informa-
tion on government performance during the term of oﬃce (t− 2l, t − l) should
be capitalized into the share of the vote got by the incumbent at the elections
held at time t − l. That information should consequently play no role in the
subsequent term of oﬃce once the lagged vote share vpmt−l is controlled for in
the time t vote function. As a result, the property tax rate set in the last year of
the previous term of oﬃce (τmt−l) should legitimately be thought of as a suit-
able instrument for τmt in the dynamic specification. Second, changes in a city
demographic structure, such as an ageing population, might add some pressure
on a city budget particularly as far as social care services are concerned, while
not having a direct impact on the popularity of incumbents: we therefore use
the percentage of elderly people (population over 65 years old) as an instru-
ment for τmt. Finally, we use as instrument the rate of unemployment in the
province where the city is located, based on the idea that city governments have
little role in active labour market policy, yet their budgetary choices might be
aﬀected by adverse macroeconomic conditions and high unemployment in own
and surrounding communities.
Table 4 reports the estimation results when the property tax rate is treated
as endogenous and instrumented as described above. The first stage statistics
suggest that the instruments have a strong explanatory power on the property
tax rate, and that they can be validly excluded from the vote equation. The
most striking result consists in the fact that, when instrumented, the tax rate
is no longer estimated to have a significant detrimental impact on governments’
popularity. This suggests that the negative eﬀect of the tax rate emerging in
the OLS estimates might in reality be due to omitted factors that are correlated
with the tax rate and have adverse popularity consequences. In general, being
the property tax the major source of revenue for city governments, it seems likely
that high accumulated debt, financial distress, waste and ineﬃciency will tend
to force city governments to raise property tax rates: in those circumstances, it
seems reasonable that overall poor budgetary management be responsible for a
loss in votes for the incumbent, rather than the property tax change itself.
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5 Conclusions
In both developed and developing countries, accurate information on govern-
ment performance is increasingly viewed as a crucial determinant of the like-
lihood of voters crossing party cleavages and reinforcing government responsi-
bility. Independent assessment of policy outcomes can play an important role
to avoid low accountability equilibria in which citizens cast their votes blindly
along partisan lines. In fact, the very process of decentralization crucially rests
on the hypothesis of elections as a disciplining device, according to which local
communities reward (punish) governments for good (bad) public service perfor-
mance while in oﬃce.
As far as decentralized environmental management is concerned, assessment
of the performance of policy-makers in managing their environmental tasks can
successfully raise local communities’ awareness of environmental issues and push
municipal authorities to adopting good practices, particularly in urban areas
facing dramatic environmental problems such as congestion, pollution, noise,
poor-quality built environment, greenhouse gas emission and waste generation.
This paper has employed a unique and highly visible index of the envi-
ronmental performance of the Italian major cities. Given that environmental
protection is one of the main responsibilities of Italian municipalities, we have
investigated the degree of “environmental accountability” of local policy-makers
and tested for the first time whether urban environmental quality is a relevant
issue in local elections. The urban environmental quality index that we have
used has a number of attractive features. Firstly, multidimensional environmen-
tal aspects are summarized into a single measure of environmental quality by
which cities can be univocally ranked. Secondly, the index has been available
for over a decade for all chief towns of province, and is comparable over years.
Finally, and more importantly, the disclosure of the city environmental report re-
ceives national and local media attention, possibly generating awareness among
citizens about the quality of their urban environment and the performance of
their governments.
Using data on all elections held between 1998 and 2007 in the 100 chief towns
of province, we have estimated a vote equation focusing on the popularity impact
of conventional measures of local tax policy and of the environmental perfor-
mance of municipal governments. The main results of our empirical analysis are
as follows. First, party attachment turns out to be an important feature of local
elections, with a large number of voters sticking to their preferred parties irre-
spective of their performance while in oﬃce. Second, the conventional picture of
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voters as fiscal conservatives is confirmed, though it seems that the detrimental
impact of a tax rise cannot to be attributed to the tax rise itself, but rather to
its role as a signal of poor public management. Finally, urban environmental
quality has considerable consequences on voters’ evaluation of local government
performance: in particular, the Legambiente index that is released in the im-
mediacy of the elections has a significant impact on election results, suggesting
that the media can be crucial actors in mitigating political agency problems by
spreading information to citizens on the performance of their governors.
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Table 1: OLS regression results static model - linear dependent variable
Dep. var.: vpmt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
τmt -2.395** -2.485** -2.432**
(0.998) (1.022) (0.999)
emt 0.273*** 0.289***
(0.095) (0.09)
r(emt) -0.055** -0.062***
(0.023) (0.022)emt 0.077 0.090
(0.081) (0.079)
Regional vote share 0.727*** 0.717*** 0.729*** 0.707*** 0.696*** 0.706***
(0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077)
Political aggregation 6.359*** 6.315*** 6.662*** 6.713*** 6.687*** 7.016***
(1.440) (1.444) (1.409) (1.455) (1.461) (1.425)
Same mayor runs 4.561*** 4.478*** 4.552*** 4.381*** 4.292*** 4.396***
(1.342) (1.348) (1.341) (1.326) (1.330) (1.324)
Year eﬀects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Prob > F 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001
Year-party eﬀects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 217 217 218 217 217 218
adj. R-sq 0.476 0.468 0.475 0.489 0.482 0.489
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parenthesis; *, **, *** (0.10, 0.05,
0.01).
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Table 2: OLS regression results static model - log odds ratio
Dep. var.: vpmt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
τmt -0.105** -0.109** -0.108**
(0.045) (0.046) (0.045)
emt 0.012*** 0.013***
(0.004) (0.004)
r(emt) -0.002** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)emt 0.003 0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
Regional vote share 0.748*** 0.737*** 0.753*** 0.727*** 0.715*** 0.728***
(0.081) (0.081) (0.082) (0.081) (0.081) (0.083)
Political aggregation 0.279*** 0.277*** 0.290*** 0.295*** 0.294*** 0.306***
(0.062) (0.063) (0.061) (0.063) (0.064) (0.062)
Same mayor runs 0.194*** 0.190*** 0.191*** 0.186*** 0.182*** 0.184***
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057)
Year eﬀects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Prob > F 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.002
Year-party eﬀects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 217 217 218 217 217 218
adj. R-sq 0.465 0.457 0.463 0.479 0.472 0.478
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parenthesis; *, **, *** (0.10, 0.05,
0.01).
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Table 3: OLS regression results dynamic model - linear dependent variable
Dependent variable: vpmt (1) (2) (3) (4)
τmt -2.610** -2.238** -2.365** -2.218**
(1.050) (0.948) (0.980) (0.977)
emt 0.355*** 0.343***
(0.098) (0.088)
r(emt) -0.078***
(0.021)emt 0.107
(0.075)
Regional vote share 0.464*** 0.449*** 0.479***
(0.077) (0.078) (0.077)
Lagged vote share 0.554*** 0.371*** 0.373*** 0.336***
(0.060) (0.062) (0.063) (0.065)
Political aggregation 9.994*** 8.504*** 8.494*** 8.562***
(1.424) (1.338) (1.342) (1.331)
Same mayor runs 5.927*** 5.374*** 5.277*** 5.289***
(1.311) (1.272) (1.279) (1.281)
Year eﬀects yes yes yes yes
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Year-party eﬀects yes yes yes yes
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 217 217 217 218
adj. R-sq 0.493 0.561 0.554 0.547
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parenthesis; *, **, *** (0.10, 0.05,
0.01).
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Table 4: Instrumental Variable regression results - linear dependent variable
IV first stage
Dependent variable: vpmt τmt
τmt -1.293
(1.512)
emt 0.337*** 0.006
(0.085) (0.006)
Regional vote share 0.471*** 0.000
(0.073) (0.005)
Lagged vote share 0.374*** -0.004
(0.059) (0.004)
Political aggregation 8.374*** 0.150*
(1.308) (0.085)
Same mayor runs 5.450*** -0.091
(1.201) (0.071)
Instruments:
τmt−l 0.650***
(0.081)
Percentage old -3.210**
(1.577)
Unemployment (province) -0.017**
(0.008)
F test instruments (p value) 26.73 (0.000)
Sargan test (p value) 1.479 (0.477)
N 217 217
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are in parenthesis; *, **, *** (0.10, 0.05,
0.01).
Hansen’s statistic statistic is the Sargan’s statistic of overidentifying restrictions that
is valid under conditional heteroskedasticity.
Left-wing party dummy, year eﬀects and year-party eﬀects included.
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A Elections
We have detailed information on the characteristics and share of the vote earned
by candidate mayors and by their supporting coalitions in all elections occurred
in the 100 major Italian cities between 1998 and 2007. As shown in Table 5,
mayors were elected at the first stage in 58% of cases and were from left-wing
coalitions in 56% of instances.
Table 5: Electoral rounds in elections, 1998-2007
Elected No. Percent
1st Stage 130 58.04
Ballot 94 41.96
Total 224 100
Table 6: Political aﬃliation of municipal governments, 1998-2007
No. Percent
Center-right coalition 98 43.75
Center-left coalition 126 56.25
Total 224 100
The Italian political environment remains characterized by a multitude of
parties. That result appears clear by looking at Table 7, where it is shown that
the total number of parties increases over time: the average value is about 14
parties in elections held in 1998 and 21 in 2007. Similarly, Table 8 shows that
the number of parties supporting the incumbent mayor increases over time too.
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Table 7: Number of parties which run for elections, 1998-2007
Election Year Average no. of parties running for elections s.d. Min Max
1998 13.72 3.09 9 19
1999 16.27 4.18 11 30
2000 16.18 4.56 9 24
2001 16.87 5.61 11 32
2002 16.46 3.97 9 26
2003 17.90 4.01 9 24
2004 17.59 4.35 11 27
2005 18.17 5.62 13 31
2006 19.48 6.34 12 36
2007 21.38 4.89 14 35
Total 17.28 5.07 9 36
Table 8: Number of parties supporting the incumbent mayor at the first round
of elections, 1998-2007
Election Year Average no. of parties supporting the incumbent mayor s.d. Min Max
1998 4.41 1.81 1 8
1999 5.83 1.09 4 8
2000 5.64 2.01 3 9
2001 5.83 2.01 3 10
2002 6.27 1.71 3 9
2003 5.80 2.20 2 8
2004 6.76 2.05 3 10
2005 7.08 3.20 3 14
2006 7.04 2.73 2 13
2007 7.73 3.68 1 20
Total 6.21 2.45 1 20
Since the municipal elections have not been held simultaneously in all munic-
ipalities, and the term of the oﬃce has been modified during the years (from 4 to
5 years in 1999), the panel is unbalanced, both in the sense that there are more
observations on some municipalities than on others, and because the elections
have been held in diﬀerent years. This is shown in the first column of Table 9.
In particular, as shown in Table 10, for 71% of the sampled municipalities we
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have complete information for two elections, while for the remaining ones three
election data are available.
Table 9: Re-election histories of mayors, 1998-2007
Year Elections Runner Re-elected % Re-elected Could not run Would not run
1998 32 24 15 63% 0 8
1999 30 19 15 79% 1 10
2000 11 4 4 100% 3 4
2001 23 8 8 100% 13 2
2002 26 13 10 77% 10 3
2003 10 5 4 80% 4 1
2004 29 13 10 77% 16 0
2005 12 4 4 100% 4 4
2006 25 12 9 75% 10 3
2007 26 13 10 77% 8 5
Total 224 115 89 77% 69 40
Table 10: Distribution of sampled municipalities according to the number of
observed elections, 1998-2007
Number of elections Freq.
1 1
2 71
3 27
Total 99
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B The Legambiente Index
Since 1994, Legambiente, an Italian independent association with the mission of
preserving and promoting the environment (www.legambiente.it), has published
an annual report, “Ecosistema Urbano”, on the environmental quality observed
in the Italian chief towns of province. Those cities represent the Italian major
urban areas, with great concentration of population (one out of three Italian
citizens) and economic activities, and play a crucial role as economic, social
and cultural drivers for neighboring areas too. Consequently, even if they rep-
resent only one seventeenth of the Italian territory, they actually face a core
set of environmental problems such as poor air quality, high level of traﬃc and
congestion, noise, poor-quality built environment, derelict land, greenhouse gas
emission, urban sprawl, generation of waste and waste-water.
The purpose of the Legambiente study is to evaluate the quality and sustain-
ability of the urban environment in order to disseminate knowledge to citizens
and policy-makers on relevant environmental matters, to stimulate local gov-
ernments to implement concrete strategies and to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of
the implemented environmental policies. Legambiente ranks the cities on the
basis of three wide categories of indicators reported in Table 11, that are se-
lected according to the standards and objectives of sustainability identified by
the European Union and the OECD. The first category of indicators refers to
the quality of the physical environment registered in the cities. The second cat-
egory concerns the pressure exercised by human activities on the environment.
The third category refers to the policies implemented by municipalities, and is
intended to proxy the environmental management ability of local policy-makers.
This category also includes the monitoring activity of harmful polluters by mu-
nicipalities. Since the third category represents a measure of the quality of
the local government response to environmental challenges and to the citizens’
needs, it is considered particularly important for assessing what has been done
by city authorities. In fact, the goal of these policies should be to encourage
changes in citizens’ behavior and consequently they have also a positive impact
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on the other two types of indicator categories. This is also reflected in the higher
weight given to these indicators in the final ranking.
Table 11: Principal indicators of Legambiente Index for category
Categories of indicators Most important indicators
1 - Physical environmental quality Air pollution
Noise pollution
Drinking water quality
Rate of mortality for
breathing apparatus diseases
2 - Pressure on environment Consumption of fuel, electricity and water
Motorization rate
Waste production
Population density
3 - Environmental policies implemented Level of separate waste collection
by municipalities Public transportation services
Urban green space
Bicycle paths
Monitoring activity
In the Italian context, the Legambiente report is the first to analyze and com-
pare the cities’ environmental performance. For some components of the index
the data sources are the statistics provided by public and private agencies. For
some indicators, the data is directly asked to municipalities, which certify the
information to be correct. Legambiente has constructed a specific survey with
a set of questions for each parameter, but the lack of public data is indicative
of the low attention given by local governments to environmental issues, and it
also represents a problem for the quality of the data. For some indicators, there
might be a comparability problem because of diﬀerent interpretations given by
diﬀerent administrators. In these situations, Legambiente has decided either to
give low weight to these indicators or not to take them in consideration. More-
over, sometimes Legambiente has not been able to evaluate some cities because
of lack of information given by the cities themselves. However, the quality and
availability of data have improved substantially over time. After 2001, all cities
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have received a comprehensive evaluation (see Table 12).
During the years, the ranking construction has undergone slight changes
because of learning by doing processes as well as thanks to the availability of
new data, and the number of indicators employed has increased. However, in
most cases the changes basically represent a more detailed analysis of the same
fundamental phenomena. For example, as from 2003 not only the intensity of use
of public transport is observed, but also its supply and environmental impact.
Overall, the structural framework based on the three indicator categories has
remained the same, making it possible to use the score to make comparisons of
cities’ performances over time.
Table 12: Summary statistics of Legambiente Index: average, minimum and
maximum scores referred to all years
Legambiente score
Year Mean score Min Max Observations
1993 57.21 28.93 74.25 70
1994 55.19 39.88 69.33 94
1995 42.90 28.32 53.78 103
1996 42.93 28.50 57.00 103
1997 42.48 23.68 50.61 99
1998 50.91 36.00 69.00 98
1999 48.29 28.80 66.40 101
2000 49.01 27.80 64.10 103
2001 50.56 28.80 67.70 103
2002 50.88 31.60 65.90 103
2003 48.20 31.30 62.00 103
2004 48.46 30.47 63.33 103
2005 54.54 31.37 69.43 103
2006 51.03 26.84 71.40 103
2007 52.32 28.04 74.63 103
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C Summary statistics
Table 13: Descriptive statistics on local variables in the chief towns of province:
election years
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Area 224 184 169 20 1285
Population 224 160,928 298,125 20,980 2,705,603
Urbanization rate 224 1138.91 1333.34 79.27 8566.36
% population < age 15 224 0.13 0.02 0.09 0.19
% population > age 65 224 0.21 0.04 0.12 0.29
Unemployment rate 224 9.34 6.81 1.65 33.16
Per capita grants 224 249 80 129 664
Disposable income per capita 224 21,037 3,954 13,112 32,060
Table 14: Descriptive statistics on the 100 chief towns of province: all years
(1998-2007)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Residential property tax rate 1000 5.03 0.67 3.20 7.00
Business property tax rate 1000 6.34 0.72 4.00 7.25
Population 1000 168,313 310,798 20,980 2,718,768
Area 1000 182.45 174.36 20.43 1285.30
Urbanization rate 1000 1197 1390 79 8646
% population < age 15 1000 0.13 0.02 0.09 0.20
% population > age 65 1000 0.21 0.04 0.11 0.29
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